BUDGETARY AND PROGRAMMING OBSTACLES TO ARMY TRANSFORMATION: A CHALLENGE FOR NOW AND THE FUTURE
There will be no moment at which the Department is "transformed." Rather, we are building a culture of continual transformation, so that our armed forces are always several steps ahead of any potential adversaries. To do so, we must envision and invest in the future today, so we can defend our homeland and our freedom tomorrow.
Donald H. Rumsfeld Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003
The Army's current Transformation stems from the strategic vision that the then Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki presented in 1999 . This Transformation process has been ongoing for over five years and has endured through significant events like the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , the current War on Terrorism, a change in administrations and a change in Army Leadership. As events unfolded around the world and the Government's bureaucratic process began to fully weigh in on Army transformation, obstacles to the process of transforming arose where policies or the transformation process will have to be altered, All of these Government and Non-Government elements have the potential to affect Army Transformation. The key is to identify the budgetary and programming obstacles or potential obstacles and make an assessment to see if changes are needed.
BACKGROUND
Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced his vision of Army Transformation in his 1999 AUSA convention speech. His point was that the cold war was over and that the potential enemies of the future are changing and that the Army must change to meet these new threats. General Shinseki stated, "To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the next century, we articulate this vision: 'Soldiers on point for the nation transforming this, the most respected army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations.' With that overarching goal to frame us, the Army will undergo a major transformation…" 1 General Shinseki was very clear that the Army's mission was still Warfighting and to fight and win the Nation's wars was paramount. He also stressed that the need to prepare the leaders of the future is critical and it would take all three components, the active, National Guard and Reserves to be successful.
General Shinseki laid out the following way ahead during his 1999 AUSA speech:
We will look for future systems which can be strategically deployed by C-17, but also be able to fit a C-130-like profile for tactical intra-theater lift. We will look for log support reductions by seeking common platform/common chassis/standard caliber designs by which to reduce our stockpile of repair parts. We will prioritize solutions which optimize smaller, lighter, more lethal, yet more reliable, fuel efficient, and more survivable options. Can we, in time, go to an all wheel vehicle fleet where even the follow-on to today's armored vehicles can come in at 50%-70% less tonnage? With the right technological solutions, we intend to transform the Army. All components, into a standard design with internetted C4ISR packages that allow us to put combat capable brigades anywhere in the world in 96 hours once we have received execute liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.
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This speech was the start to a very fast paced process for transforming the Army, a process that would begin immediately, and one that would cause people to think out-side of the box to make the transformation happen and produce the capabilities desired.
In closing, General Shinseki made the commitment that soldiers would remain the Army's centerpiece and that readiness would not be diminished. "Our physical, moral, and mental competence will give us the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, anytime. We will be trained, we will be ready to do anything the American people ask us to do, and we will do it better, faster, and more affordably." Since General Shinseki put the Army on the path to transformation significant changes have occurred from a new administration being sworn in, to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and to the change of Army Leadership, to include General Shinseki himself. (1) require the release, at the design readiness review, of not less than 90 percent of engineering drawings for the building of prototypes; (2) require, before facilitating production or contracting for items with long lead times, that an acceptable demonstration be carried out of the performance of the information network, including the performance of the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical; and (3) require, before the initial production decision, that an acceptable demonstration be carried out of the collective capability of each system to meet system-of-systems requirements when integrated with the information network.
the funding support would be there to completion. "The Army's plans are highly dependent on near-term technological advances that are uncertain and long-term funding commitments."
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As the Army's transformation progresses, the GAO began to look at specific combat systems such as the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT). These reports pointed out challenges and provided recommendations to keep the Army on track with its transformation.
"The Army faces numerous challenges in forming its first IBCT… planned combat capabilities
will not be present when the IBCT is to be certified for deployment in May 2003. Specifically, two interim armored vehicles… require further development and will not be delivered until 2004…training challenges exist since the interim armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for training." 13 The reports findings and recommendations were generally accepted.
In 2003, the GAO was asked to audit the Army's Stryker brigade, provide an assessment with recommendations.
Based on our observation of events and analysis of the data collected in accordance with the Army's plan, the brigade demonstrated that it could perform as designed, but it did not consistently demonstrate it capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths were illustrated by the brigade's ability to deploy using different transportation systems and the individual unit's ability to take advantage of the speed, agility, and maneuverability of the Stryker vehicle. With regard to weaknesses, the brigade had difficulties in (1) mastering staff operations… (2) Using its digital systems… (3) Conducting supply operations… and (4) executing company-level combat missions, which reduced its overall combat power.
14 The overall tone of this report was positive with recommendations on how to keep this transformation effort on track.
GAO not only looks at systems, but also often is asked to look at the Department of Defense's financial management and business processes. In its testimony before the Congressional Subcommittees, GAO emphasized the real need for reform within DOD and reiterated the following recommendations, "(1) an integrated business management transformation strategy, (2) sustained leadership and resource control, (3) clear lines of responsibilities and accountability, (4) results-oriented performance, (5) appropriate incentives and consequences, (6) an enterprise architecture to guide reform efforts, and (7) effective monitoring and oversight." 15 Through a significant review of recent Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts, and GAO reports, two clear potential obstacles to Army Transformation are apparent, (1) Congressional interest in the transformation systems the Army is procuring and (2) the financial management and business processes that control the transformation process need improvement. Both of these can be significant, disrupt current year budgets and change future year programs, and both can be overcome. The key is keeping Congress informed as requested and demonstrating the willingness to make the hard right decisions when system issues and problems arise or are identified through GAO reports. The Army will need to continue to support the effort in the Department of Defense's Financial and Business Management Transformation. It is critical that Congress has the confidence that the Army and DOD are properly managing the resources that are provided. If not, there will be more controls and constraints put in place that will slow the entire process and could cause some of the transformation efforts to be terminated. I am pleased to send to Congress a bold strategy for improving the management and performance of the federal government. Government likes to begin thingsto declare grand new programs and causes. But good beginnings are not the measure of success. What matters in the end is completion. Performance. Results. Not just making promises, but making good on promises. In my Administration, that will be the standard from the farthest regional office of government to the highest office in the land 16 The agenda lays out 14 areas in which improvement is needed. The first five areas address Government-wide initiatives for reducing fraud, waste and abuse. The remaining nine areas cover agency specific programs to help improve government performance. Two of the nine specific programs belong to the Department of Defense.
PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL IMPLICATIONS
The President established four basic long-term results he expected all agencies to meet.
Agencies will take a disciplined and focused approach to address these longstanding and substantial challenges and begin the steps necessary to become high performing organizations in which: hierarchical, "command and control" bureaucracies will become flatter and more responsive; emphasis on process will be replaced by a focus on results; organizations burdened with overlapping functions, inefficiencies, and turf battles will function more harmoniously; and agencies will strengthen and make the most of the knowledge, skills, and abilities of their people; in order to meet the needs and expectations of their ultimate clients-the American people. 17 This management agenda was only the initial step in the administrations efforts to improve government. The administration published other documents like the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism that affect the way the government operates, especially the Department of Defense. In addition, the administration has been changing the structure of government since September 11, 2001 , to include major policy changes with respect to Homeland Security, economic growth, medical coverage, and many other areas.
On August the 16, 2004 , the President announced a major change in restructuring U.S.
military forces around the world. This is an effort to create a more flexible force, reduce personnel turbulence and costs.
Over the coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more flexible force, which means that more of our troops will be stationed and deployed from here at home. We will move some of our troops and capabilities to new locations, so they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats. We'll take advantage of the 21 st century military technologies to rapidly deploy increased combat power. The new plan will help us fight and win these wars of the 21 st century. It will strengthen our alliances around the world, while we build new partnerships to better preserve the peace. It will reduce the stress on our troops and our military families. 18 In the same announcement, President Bush talked about how the United States would support NATO's transformation as well as the changes that would be made in each region throughout the world.
The President's National Security Strategy outlines the United States' "Grand Strategy" for upholding human dignity, defeating global terrorism, defusing regional conflicts, preventing attacks from Weapons of Mass Destruction, fostering global economic growth, expanding democracy, and specifically it addresses transforming America's National Security Institutes.
"The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world's most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces." 19 The National Security Strategy points out four things the military must do effectively as it transforms; "…assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats against U.S.
interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails." 20 The strategy outlined within this document effects the government across all agencies with a significant cost associated with it. There will be trade-offs that must be made and risk taken in implementing the strategy.
President Bush signed the National Strategy for Homeland Security July 16, 2002 . The first document of its kind that puts in place a strategy to secure the Homeland, integrate federal agencies, state and local governments, private sector business and an informed citizenry. "We have produced a comprehensive national strategy that is based on the principles of cooperation and partnership. As a result of this Strategy, firefighters will be better equipped to fight fires, police officers better armed to fight crime, businesses better able to protect their data and information systems, and scientists better able to fight Mother Nature's deadliest diseases." 21 In analyzing this document, a significant amount of specified and implied tasks are listed for federal agencies as well as state and local governments that will require increased resources to implement.
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is another document like the National Security Strategy, lays out goals and objectives in some detail as to how the United States will win the war on terrorism. "The intent of our national strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world, ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them." 22 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is a supporting document to the National Security Strategy. As the war on terrorism continues, this document, like the National Security Strategy, increases the responsibilities of many of the federal agencies and furthers the demands for resources to fully support these new responsibilities. Is it likely that some of these responsibilities will be reduced? The answer is probably not as can be seen in the conclusion remarks of this document. "We will be resolute. Others might flag in the face of the inevitable ebb and flow of the campaign against terrorism. But the American people will not." 23 It is clear that there are many programs and policies the President has put into effect that either imply or specify a function or mission be performed that has the potential to be an obstacle to the Army's plan for transformation. A majority of the programs and policies the President has instituted must be resourced. In order to resource them, priorities will be set, trade-offs will be made and risks will be taken. This might mean some of the Army's transformation programs will be eliminated or pushed to the out-years for funding. The key will be to anticipate these changes and make adjustments that will keep the Army relevant and the thrust of the Army's transformation on track. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, the explosive advance of modern technology, and the forces of globalization that are making the technology available to ally and adversary alike, make the transformation of U.S. military power essential. While much of the existing defense establishment can be adapted to 21 st Century needs, a good deal cannot. We must move forcefully to rationalize the costly burden of force structures and practices that do not contribute to current and future U.S. security needs. If confirmed as Secretary, I plan to pursue five key objectives…; First, we need to fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the contemporary security environment…; Second, the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces…;Third, U.S. command-controlcommunication, intelligence and space capabilities must be modernized…;Fourth, the U.S. defense establishment must be transformed…; and Fifth, reform of DOD structures, processes and organization. The strategy that results is built around four goals that will guide the development of U.S. forces and capabilities, their deployment and use: Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of purpose and its capabilities to fulfill its security commitments; Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends; Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeats attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails. 25 As with any new strategy, there comes a multitude of specified and implied tasks and missions. For example, under QDR section II, Defense Strategy lays out the details of how the U.S. military will support the policy goals of Assuring, Dissuading, Deterring and Defeating.
DOD LEVEL IMPLICATIONS
Assuring; "…the U.S. military will promote security cooperation with allies and friendly nations." 26 Dissuading; "…experiment with revolutionary operational concepts, capabilities, and organizational arrangements and to encourage the development of a culture within the military that embraces innovation and risk-taking." 27 Deterring; "… requires non-nuclear forces that can strike with precision at fixed and mobile targets throughout the depth of an adversary's territory; active and passive defenses; and rapidly deployable and sustainable forces that can decisively defeat any adversary." 28 Defeating; "…must maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or friends." 29 As can be seen these are very broad areas of responsibilities that have many subtasks associated with them. Any one of these sub-tasks has the potential to change current budgets and future programs for Army Transformation.
An (5) assuring information systems and conducting information operations; and (6) Enhancing space capabilities." 33 Again, another document with a broad range of specified and implied tasks directed at each of the services. The results of this study further illustrate the direction that the Department is heading with transformation, and the study results could lead to potential budgetary and programming obstacles. "The Study Team's task was to examine and improve DoD processes for determining needs, creating solutions, making decisions, and providing capabilities to support joint warfighting needs." 36 The study found that the services controlled the requirements process, the Combatant Commanders had little input, the services had a narrow focus solutions and the resourcing process did not allow senior leadership to provide guidance early on. 37 The study recommended a capabilities-based process with a "born joint" resource process.
Under that process, joint needs would be defined with a Department wide view based on extensive input from all users of Defense capabilities, particularly the Combatant Commands. Capabilities planning characterizes and quantifies both warfighting and enterprise needs, ensuring integration of the full range of materiel and non-materiel considerations. Doctrine, organizational, training, personnel, leadership, and facilities issues should be considered simultaneously with platforms, weapon systems, and costs.
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In addition, the study made recommendations for organizational changes within both OSD and the Joint staff. The team developed sets of recommendations that went from moderate to radical and at varying levels of consolidation. All oriented toward supporting a new capabilitiesbased process that allows the Combatant Commanders greater play within the process.
The last significant document at the Department level is the 2004 National Military
Strategy. This document, like the previous ones mentioned, lays out strategy and vision for the future of the United States Armed Forces. It also specifically addresses how the Armed Forces will transform.
…we will transform the Armed Forces "in stride" -fielding new capabilities and adopting new operational concepts while actively taking the fight to terrorists. Transformation requires a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments -adjustments that reward innovation and creativity. In-stride transformation will ensure US forces emerge from the struggle against terrorism with our joint force fully prepared to meet future global chanllenges. 39 Again, the trend is for increasing joint force capabilities, fighting the war on terrorism and preparing for the future all at the same time. Many specified and implied tasks, with varying costs to implement, and more potential budget and program obstacles to Army transformation.
As seen in all of these key documents at the Department level there are significant requirements listed that must be accomplished, all of which can be considered potential budget and program obstacles to Army Transformation. But when you analyze all of these requirements, they all focus on two main ideas, creating an OSD/Joint staff that is more responsive to the defense needs of the United States and a military that can operate in a joint environment and capitalize on each of the services capabilities. With this in mind, there are only two obstacles that the Army must concern itself with. First, ensuring the Army staff aligns itself with that of the OSD/Joint staff and second, the Army's transformation must be founded in the Joint Operations arena.
ARMY LEVEL IMPLICATIONS
The Army currently has two key documents that lay out the plan and policies for its The crucial point about these four documents is they must be in line with each other, or there is a great potential to have a system come on line and the personnel and training not be ready. The Army Plan must also provide the guidance to ensure the Army is providing the required support that is directed by the OSD/Joint staffs and the combatant commanders. There are many other organizations and documents that play into this process. All of which the Army Staff must sort out in order to create the Army's programs and a budget that will fund them.
Another area that plays into the budget process quite heavily and to some extent programming is that of the current operations of the Army. The Army is fighting the war on terrorism and has forces deployed around the world executing other missions like maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula, conducting stability operations in the Balkins and fighting the drug war is Central and South America. All these operations take a tremendous amount of resources not to mention the wear on equipment and personnel. All of this has great potential to affect the Army's transformation plan.
The operations in Iraq are starting to have senior leaders think about changing the Army's Transformation plan based on the tactics and techniques being used to defeat the insurgents.
The Army is discarding or delaying big parts of its longstanding plans. It recently announced it has pushed back introduction of its new lightweight fighting vehicle for several years, to 2014, freeing up $9 billion. Earlier plans had called for all of the service's combat units to be built around light, quick, armored vehicle. The Army now thinks it will need a mix of slower-to-deploy, heavy tanks as well as light fighting vehicles. This will allow commanders to swing quickly between tasks, the Army says, from handing out emergency rations on one block to conducting an all-out battle with insurgents on another. Commanders in Iraq have found that 70-ton tanks, which literally shake the ground as they move, can help ward off guerrilla attacks simply through intimidation. 43 As the war on terrorism continues, there is potential to see many changes in the Army's transformation plan based on finding better ways to fight the enemies of the future.
Within the Army itself, there are many areas that could become significant program and budgetary obstacles to the Army's transformation. Whenever a senior leader changes there is a potential to change policy or direction of the Army. If the Army Staff does not understand the plan and how to work it through the process, it could slow the transformation efforts. When doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures must be changed, there is potential to have to change the transformation plan. Any significant change in the plan will have to be reviewed by OSD, which in turn could cause more changes, and these types of changes could manifest themselves as they go forward to Congress for funding.
NON-GOVERNMENT IMPLICATIONS
There are other elements that weigh into this process of transformation that could have the same affect or even more then those outlined above. Advanced technological development by itself is clearly not sufficient to ensure a successful military transformation. Coupled with advances in doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training, however, advanced technology is a significant force multiplier. Maintaining our technological lead in the future will be critical to the operations of our fighting forces. Technologists, operators, and acquisition specialists together can create and implement the policies so vital to ensuring this critical requirement.
Transformation after General Shinseki's announced plan for transforming the Army. The article is a detailed analysis of Army Transformation and is looks at transformation through two doctrines at the time.
How well Army transformation is able to deal with that disconnect, however, will depend a great deal on future US policy concerning the use of military force. At one extreme is the so-called Powell Doctrine, a relatively restrictive approach to the subject. At the other extreme is what has popularly come to be called the Clinton Doctrine, a more liberal prescription for the use of force. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how those two doctrines will influence the transformation of the US Army as it struggles to move forward toward a genuine revolution in military affairs, and how that transformation process can in turn mitigate the worst excesses of both doctrines. 47 There are literally hundreds of articles, books and writings on transformation. All of these might not directly affect transformation, but all may have influences on the decision makers as they create and implement policies and build programs and budgets to support transformation.
Corporate America can also weigh-in on Army transformation through lobbying for their specific weapons program or system. In addition, there are numerous other organizations or entities that have the potential to influence Army transformation through the United States' very open system of government.
CONCLUSION
The Army has a very solid plan for Transformation that has been recognized as such by DoD, GAO and others. The key to the Army's plan is that it is flexible and the Army leadership understands that adjustments and changes are the norm when you are fighting a global war and at the same time changing the force to prepare it to meet future challenges.
This paper identified many budgetary and programming obstacles at every level of government including non-government elements that have the potential to significantly influence the Army's transformation plan. After analyzing these obstacles and potential obstacles, they all basically fall into three areas, current administration's agenda, global war on terrorism and outside influences.
The current administration's agenda is nothing more then having a government that is results oriented with a defined method to measure the results. Specifically for the Department of Defense is an organization that is Joint Operations capable and able to meet current and future mission requirements. The current Army Transformation Road map is focused on both of these areas. The key to the Army is to understand these requirements and ensure changes are made in the transformation plan with respect to any changes within these areas. The budgetary and programming obstacles are many and can have significant affect, but none at this time appear to be an absolute showstopper. Clearly adjustments will have to be made as the war on terrorism continues and resources become limited. So long as these changes are not made in a vacuum, the Army's transformation will continue to move forward.
The Army has a strong transformation plan that is supported by the Department of Defense, the Administration and Congress.
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